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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 2 - LIMITATrIONS OF TImE
CPLR 204(b).: Toll will not be granted where
colorable basis for arbitration is lacking.
CPLR 204(b) tolls the statute of limitations for the period
between a demand for arbitration and a final determination that
there is no obligation to arbitrate. Section (b) is not explicitly
qualified to apply only to well-founded, controvertible, demands
for arbitration, but reason dictates that there be some such quali-
fied use of the provision.
In Watkins v. Holiday Drive-Ur-Self, Inc.,' the court, since it
found that there was no basis for believing that arbitration was
available, refused to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
actions, in demanding arbitration, are probably explained by a
mistaken belief that the defendant's insurance carrier was a signa-
tory to an agreement providing for arbitration.
The bar should thus note that a demand for arbitration must
be made with care for if it is legally an empty request, made
either through mistake or as a tactic to increase one's time to
deal with a case, it will have no effect on the running of the
statute of limitations. Thus, an attorney who allows the statute
to expire during such a course of action may be subject to the
danger of a malpractice suit.
CPLR 214: "Continuing practice" theory applied
in attorney malpractice cases.
Generally, in a malpractice case, the statute of limitations
runs from the time that the malpractice occurs 2 rather than from
the time when it is discovered. However, various exceptions to
the general rule have evolved.3  For example, in the medical
field, the "continuing practice" theory has received Court of Ap-
peals' endorsement. 4  According to this theory, if treatment con-
tinues after the actual malpractice, the statute runs from the
date of the last treatment. The rationale is that, where treat-
ment occurs on more than an occasional -visit and extends over a
period of time, the relationship between patient and doctor must
129 App. Div. 2d 810, 287 N.Y.S.2d 730 (3d Dep't 1968).
2 Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (lst Dep't),
aff'd weithout opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); see 1 WEINsTIN,
KoRN & MILER, NE w YORK Civm PRAarcr 1214.18 (1966) for a discus-
sion of the problems raised when there are unknown injuries.3 See McLaughlin, Annual Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice,
14 SYRAcusE: L. REv. 347, 353-54 (1962).4 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).
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be one of trust and confidence. It would be detrimental to such
a relationship for the patient to question the doctor's every action
at the moment of execution.
Courts in the first and second departments have recently
employed this exception in attorney malpractice suits.5 In the
first department case of Wilson v. Econom,6 suit was brought
against an attorney when it was discovered that he had failed
to institute the plaintiff's action within the short one year and
thirty day period of limitations applicable to suits against the
Transit Authority. The attorney's office repeatedly assured the
plaintiff that his case was proceeding properly. A Bar Asso-
ciation investigation subsequently revealed a contrary state of
affairs.
In the second department a similar situation arose in Siegel
v. Kranis,7 but the appellate division, in deciding the case, gave
no indication that it was aware of the prior treatment of the
problem in Wilson. The malpractice suit arose from a failure
to file a timely MVAIC claim. In both cases the courts felt
that the similarity of a doctor-patient and an attorney-client
relationship was more than superficial. Both necessitate continued
trust, confidence and attention.
With sound authority in two departments for an extension of
the "continuing practice" theory, a malpractice suit can not now
be evaded by merely giving a client meaningless reassurances or
by futile attempts to remedy the situation.
APTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERvicE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Making promissory note payable in New York
not deemed a transaction of business here.
The appellate division, first department, in Wirth v. Prenyls
recently held that personal jurisdiction will not be obtained in
New York by merely making a promissory note payable here.
In Wirth, the underlying contract involved the shipment of ma-
chinery from the United Kingdom, by the plaintiff, a New York
resident, to the defendant, an Argentine domiciliary. Disputes
under the contract were to be arbitrated by the Argentine Stock
Exchange. Suing on the promissory note alone, plaintiff sought
5 It is especially significant to note the second department's use of the
theory, for it, originally, was somewhat restrictive even in the medical area.
Borgia v. City of New York, 16 App. Div. 2d 927i 229 N.Y.S.2d 318(2d Dep't), rezfd, 12 N.Y2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).656 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1968).
729 App. Div. 2d 447, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968).829 App. Div. 2d 373, 288 NY.52d 377 (1st Dep't 1968).
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